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Abstract
This paper studies, in a numerical environment, climate treaties
with emissions trading when national quotas result from strategic in-
dividual choice. We nd that the larger the number of parties to the
deal, the smaller are the emissions reductions and the lower the welfare.
If insisting on stability with respect to participation, climate treaties
involve few parties and yield practically no emissions reductions. While
these results contrast with some optimistic studies, our numerical ex-
ample conrms established results if modelling the problem in the more
traditional sense.
JEL classication: C72, D62, Q54.
1 Introduction
The e¢ ciency arguments for international emissions trading when the initial
allocation of permits is considered as already given are well established. Quite
simply, voluntary exchange cannot harm any trading party. Moreover, this
policy instrument has further been identied as a promising tool when the
initial allocation is not already given, but rather is part of the problem. The
Both authors acknowledge funding from the NORKLIMA program of the Norwegian
Research Council.
yInstitute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, and Uni Rokkan
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reason is that it can serve as a vehicle to facilitate side payments in inter-
national negotiations. Such payments have the potential to broaden interna-
tional participation and deepen the emissions cuts. This conclusion applies
regardless of whether the underlying model of international negotiations is
presumed to follow the early works by Barrett [1] and Carraro and Siniscalco
[5] or whether one adopts Chander and Tulkens[7] alternative perspective.1
A common assumption in these and other studies on international environ-
mental agreements is that the aggregate emissions target is set to a level that
maximizes the collective objectives of those parties signing a deal.
However, several decades of international climate talks have resulted in
little agreement other than the Kyoto Protocol. When looking at the ag-
gregate target of those countries with quantied commitments that ratied
that treaty, a large literature has concluded that the resulting aggregate tar-
get is not substantially di¤erent from their business as usual emissions; see,
e.g., Springer [22] for a survey. Hence, although well furnished with good
intentions, the international climate talks thus far have resulted in few out-
comes that resemble e¢ cient bargaining and collective behaviour. Despite
this, emissions trading as a policy tool has emerged at centre stage.
The purpose of this paper is to examine some possible consequences of
emissions trading in a fairly fragmented world where governments struggle
to get together and maximize their collective objectives. Rather, we take it
that decisions are better reected by governments optimizing on individual
concerns along the lines considered in the studies by Helm [14] and Carbone
et al. [3] among others.2 In this type of setting, governments that decide to
take on quantied international commitments select their quotas individually
while still recognizing each others targets as transferable documents that are
suitable for compliance the latter presumed to be enforced.
What could such a setting possibly deliver in terms of overall e¢ ciency? To
address this question, it is best to take the classical non-cooperative outcome
of reference as a point of departure where emissions are reduced to the level
where the marginal abatement cost in a country is equated to the domestic
marginal damage cost. There are two sources of ine¢ ciencies associated with
the latter outcome. First, global emissions are too large. Second, they are
ine¢ ciently allocated. When governments select their quotas and then engage
in trade, the di¤erences in marginal emissions reduction costs will tend to be
1More recent and relevant studies dealing with asymmetric countries and side payments
possibly via emissions trading in these two traditions of literature include Carraro et al.
[4], McGinty [18], Brechét et al. [2], Chander [6] and Flåm [12].
2See also Copeland and Taylor [8], Cramton and Stoft [9], [10], Holtsmark and Sommer-
voll [15] and Godal and Holtsmark [13] for closely related literature.
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traded away, reducing the second source of ine¢ ciency. Therefore, the merits
of the overall outcome are dependent on aggregate emissions, as given by the
sum of the targets. As Helm [14] has already established that the total e¤ect
is sensitive to parameter values, we follow Carbone et al. [3] in relying on
numerical simulations. Our models focus on di¤erent aspects; in particular,
they consider more goods whereas we consider more players.
Among the 4083 possible climate deals between subgroups of the 12 major
greenhouse-gas-emitting countries included in our analysis, we identify six
treaties that satisfy the property that no member wants to exit (internal
stability). Each of the six treaties involves only two parties and they all
bring the economy very close to the no-trade outcome of reference. One of
the six treaties is also externally stable in that no non-signatory wants to
enter. Putting issues of participation stability aside, we nd that the larger
the number of participants, the lower the global welfare. Most arrangements,
including that with full participation, imply e¢ ciency levels below the classical
non-cooperative (no-trade) solution. A main explanation for the latter results
is that the permit price will equal the average marginal climate cost of the
countries that sign the deal, as noted by Helm [14]. As such, we do not
think it is surprising that behaviours that fall short of joint maximization
yield ine¢ cient outcomes. Nevertheless, our results are in contrast to the
rather optimistic results of Carbone et al. [3] concerning what international
emissions trading may possibly accomplish in a fragmented world.
For comparisons, we also use our example to illustrate the more classical
models of international environmental agreements where signatories maximize
their joint objectives so that the permit price will equal the aggregate mar-
ginal damage costs for those signing a deal. When modelling the situation
as a cartel formation game, our results are in line with similar studies, e.g.
Carraro et al. [4], McGinty [18] and Brechét et al. [2]. We also compute a
treaty that is stable in the sense of the gamma core, which therefore is also
e¢ cient.
A property that comes through in many of our stable agreements however
dened is that money is transferred from countries that presumably are most
heavily a¤ected by climate change, such as China, India and Europe, which
pay those parties that incur much of the implementation costs, such as Russia
and the USA. This illustrates that transfers the other way may be misaligned
with participation incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the economic
environment and spell out the theories all well established that we shall
carry out simulations on. Section 3 briey discusses how the model was pa-
rameterized, with further details relegated to a supplement. Section 4, the
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heart of the paper, o¤ers results and Section 5 concludes.
2 The economic environment and the models
2.1 The setting
There is a xed and nite set I of countries. Each country i 2 I has an
economic benet i (ei) of discharging ei units of greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere, and is adversely a¤ected by climate damages vi (e), where e :=P
i2I ei: In our simulations, i is increasing and concave in a quadratic manner
up to business as usual emissions, and vi is linear with v0i (e) > 0 for all i 2 I.
Before we turn to the various games to be considered, we rst recall two
well-known outcomes of reference.
Emissions (ei)i2I are Pareto e¢ cient if 
0
i (ei) =
X
j2I
v0j (e) (1)
for all i 2 I. A no-trade, non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium prole (ei )i2I satises 
0
i (e

i ) = v
0
i (e
) (2)
for all i 2 I. In (1), e := Pi2I ei and similar shorthand notation applies for
e in (2).
2.2 Climate deals with individual maximization
This section restates the model of main interest originally formulated by
Helm [14]. The game has a three stage structure. First, parties seen as
governments decide whether or not they want to participate in a climate
treaty with international emissions trading, thereby belonging to a list C  I.3
Second, every government selects a quota !i of permits that is transferred to
domestic economic agents named rms. Third, rms select emissions ei where
those that belong to C can trade permits among each other, while others
cannot.
As customary, we start with the last stage of the game. To avoid unnec-
essary cluttering of notations, all rms within a country are represented via a
single entity named a rm. This agent takes the permit price p and its quota
3In the next subsection, we will follow the standard terminology and refer to C as a
coalition. In the current subsection, such usage is somewhat misleading, as no group of
countries maximize their joint objectives.
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!i as given, and if its government has decided to participate in the treaty, it
solves
max
ei
fi (ei) + p  (!i   ei)g for each i 2 C;
where p clears
P
i2C ei =
P
i2C !i. A rm in a country that is not participating
in trade sets ei = !i.
At the intermediate second stage, governments select their quotas. If
government i 2 C then this choice solves
max
!i
fi (ei)  vi (e) + p  (!i   ei)g for all i 2 C; (3)
recognizing that p and e will depend on the selected !i. A government not in
C simply solves
max
!i
fi (ei)  vi (e)g. (4)
Before proceeding with stage one of the game, we state the rst order
necessary optimality conditions for the two stages. For each i 2 C;
0i (ei) = p and
P
j2C ei =
P
j2C !i, (5)
0i (ei)  v0i (e) + @p@!i (!i   ei) = 0 (6)
where
@p
@!i
=
1P
j2C
1
00j (ej)
.
For each i =2 C
ei = !i and 0i (ei)  v0i (e) = 0.
In (6), we have made use of the rst equality in (5). For readers interested in
more details, please see Helm [14].
We complete with the rst stage of the game, aimed at nding a stable
list C of countries subscribing to the treaty. Denote by i (C) the value
function associated with government is objective in problem (3) when i 2 C
and (4) otherwise. As customary, C is declared internally stable under an
open membership rule if
i (C)  i (C n fig) (7)
for all i 2 C so that a member does not prefer to leave it. Furthermore, C is
externally stable under an open membership rule if for each i =2 C
i (C [ fig)  i (C) ; (8)
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implying that no outsider is keen on becoming a member. A coalition C is
then stable if it is both internally and externally stable; dAspremont et al.
[11] is a standard reference.
The external stability concept has some properties that are not immedi-
ately appealing. For instance, if a country wants to join a treaty, but no
participating country would appreciate its presence, it seems plausible that it
could be blocked from becoming a member. Following Sáiz et al. [21] among
others, this motivates some modied notions of external stability.
A list C is unanimously externally stable if for every i =2 C for which
i (C [ fig)  i (C) (9)
if any, there exists at least one j 2 C for which
j (C [ fig) < j (C) : (10)
As this unanimity rule is founded on a fairly stringent albeit often applied
consensus principle, we shall also make use of the following alternative for-
mulation. If for every i =2 C for which (9) is true, condition (10) holds for a
majority of those that belong to C; then C is externally stable via majority.
2.3 Models for comparisons
Before we turn to our numerical example, we briey recall the two arguably
most studied models of international environmental agreements. Both have a
two stage structure where at the second stage, members of what we now name
a coalition C  I, which was formed at stage one, select a vector of emissions
(ei)i2C that
maximizes
X
i2C
fi (ei)  vi (e)g: (11)
Each country that does not belong to C nds an ei that solves
maxfi (ei)  vi (e)g: (12)
Here, coalition members and outsiders are also a¤ected by each others deci-
sion via the common environment. This externality is again accounted for in
the format of a non-cooperative game, where the coalition and the outsiders
take the choices made by others as given. The necessary rst order conditions
are therefore given by
0i (ei) =
P
j2C v
0
j (e) for all i 2 C and
0i (ei) = v
0
i (e) for all i =2 C.

(13)
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Cartel stability
If side payments (or transfers) between members of a coalition are banned,
then the same notions of internal and external stability as discussed in the
previous subsection can be directly applied. Conversely, if monetary transfers
between parties take place, possibly accompanied by permits owing the other
way, a broader notion of internal stability becomes useful. Following Carraro
et al. [4], a coalition is said to be potentially internally stable if the payo¤ to
the whole coalition C (C) :=
P
i2C i (C) satises
C (C) 
X
i2C
i (C n fig) .
This means that if a coalition is potentially internally stable, it generates a
su¢ cient surplus that can be allocated among its members so that no party
can benet from leaving.
Core stability
Underlying the cartel stability concept is the assumption that if a member
leaves the coalition, the rest of the coalition remains intact. If we instead
assume the remaining coalition disintegrates when a member leaves, then one
can identify an element in the so-called gamma core (Chander and Tulkens
[7]). More precisely, let (Wi)i2I be a vector of payo¤s where the elements add
up to the society-wide payo¤ that is the most achievable:
P
i2IWi = I (I).
If such a vector satisesX
i2C
Wi  C (C) for all C  I,
then it belongs to the core.
When damages are linear, as they will be in our numerical experiments,
there is a particular and easily computable prole, which satises the gamma
core stability property; see, e.g. Brechét et al. [2]. It is given by
Wi = i (e

i )  vi (e) + i
 X
j2I
fj(ej)  vj (e)g  
X
j2I
fj(ej)  vj (e)g
!
(14)
for all i 2 I, where i := v0i (ei) =
P
j2I v
0
j (ej) is agent is share of total mar-
ginal damage. Formula (14) quite simply says that a country receives its
non-cooperative Nash payo¤ plus a share of the gains from cooperation in
proportion with how severely the country is a¤ected by climate change.
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3 Parameterization and benchmarks
This section starts by briey discussing how the model was parameterized,
with the details relegated to a supplement. Subsequently, we present the two
outcomes of reference: the classical non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and the
Pareto optimal solution.
The player set: While the world consists of about 190 nations, it is dif-
cult to accommodate that fact in our numerical environment. Our choice
of a specic collection of 11 countries, together with Europe (essentially the
European Union), was motivated by the desire to include countries that pre-
sumably are important in the sense of size when it comes to the issue of climate
change.4 In that respect, our approach is not unique. Furthermore, we con-
trast some literature by hesitating to model multinational regions other than
Europe as individual players. In fact, it is this lack of collective behaviour
that is at the very heart of the problem. For the same reason, those countries
that are not represented individually in the model (i.e. the rest of the world)
are not represented as a single decision maker but instead excluded from the
model.
The benet function i (ei): We implemented carbon taxes in the in-
tertemporal computable general equilibriummodel MERGE of the world econ-
omy developed by Manne and Richels [16], [17] to obtain simulation data for
the year 2020. These data indicate how much emissions would be reduced in
each MERGE region for various levels of a carbon tax. Simple OLS regres-
sions on these data indicate that marginal benets (i.e. marginal abatement
costs) have a good linear t for taxes in the range 0250 US dollar per tonne
of carbon. More specically, the region with the poorest t (Japan) had an
R-square equal to 0.82, with all others being above 0.9. The marginal benet
function is given by maxfai   ciei; 0g where the parameters ai; ci > 0 and
where business as usual emissions are given by ai=ci. Benets, i (ei), are nor-
malized to zero at business as usual emissions. Thus, they become negative
and are equivalent to abatement costs.
The damage function vi (e): The damage function is assumed linear for
all countries so that v0i (e) > 0 is simply a constant, and its value is taken
from simulation results of the RICE model by Nordhaus [19]5. In particular,
we used results from RICE to distribute estimates of global marginal damage.
4The regions included in our analysis comprise about 78 per cent of global emissions.
5The stated reference o¤ers a description of the sister model of RICE, namely
DICE. We used results from the RICE model, downloaded from Nordhaus web-
page http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/RICEModelDiscussionasofSeptember30.htm in Febru-
ary 2010.
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As climate damages in RICE are at the low end compared with other studies,
we also made use of the literature review by Tol [23] dealing with studies of
the global marginal damage of greenhouse gas emissions.
Both the MERGE and the RICE models have aggregated the world into
only a few regions. We used data for gross national income taken from the
World Bank to disaggregate the benet and damage functions. Precisely how
this was done is explained in the supplement. The parameters used in the
numerical analysis are given in Table 1 and apply to the year 2020. In the
Tables and Figures, we use the following abbreviations: M is million, B is
billion, t is (metric) tonne, C is carbon and yr is year.
Table 1 about here.
Table 2 reports key gures for emissions reductions and payo¤s in the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium as well as the Pareto optimum.
Table 2 about here.
Table 2 shows that without any form of climate treaty (non-cooperative Nash),
global emissions reductions are 1.5 per cent in total, as compared with busi-
ness as usual emissions. However, the e¢ cient level of global reductions is
10.7 per cent. A quite large share of these additional reductions occur in the
USA. The increased reductions from Nash to Pareto increases global welfare
from 634 to 608 billion US$ per year, so that the total gain available with
an e¢ cient climate policy is about 26 billion US$ per year.
What is notable is the distribution of these e¢ ciency gains given in the
last column in Table 2. Europe, China and India gain most of the benets
in the e¢ cient solution, while the USA and some other countries in fact are
worse o¤ (when not receiving side payments). The explanation behind this
result lies in the third column of Table 2, showing that the USA carries by far
the largest emissions reductions compared with the Nash equilibrium point.
Furthermore, although the USA will benet from lower damages, these are not
su¢ cient to cover the increased abatement costs. Countries such as China and
India carry out more modest reductions, but because they are more severely
a¤ected by climate change, their benets from the Pareto e¢ cient solution
become more pronounced.
For later discussions on gains in environmental e¤ectiveness and economic
e¢ ciency associated with various partial climate agreements, we dene two
indices. Recall that e and e have been dened as global emissions under
Pareto optimality (1) and the classical non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (2),
9
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respectively. Write  and  for the global welfare (the sum of individual
payo¤s i) associated with these proles. Moreover, let eI (C) :=
P
i2I ei (C)
be the global emissions when a particular list of countries sign a climate deal,
and recall that I (C) is the global welfare similarly dened (=
P
i2I i (C)).
The environmental e¤ectiveness eC and economic e¢ ciency 

C of a particular
climate treaty are then dened as
eC :=
eC (C)  e
e  e and 

C :=
C (C)  
   (15)
respectively. Construed in this way, both indices take the value zero in the
Nash equilibrium and one in the Pareto optimum. A negative number indi-
cates that emissions (welfare) are larger (smaller) than that associated with
the non-cooperative Nash. Finally, note that as our model contains 12 coun-
tries, there are 4083 possible coalitions containing at least two countries.
4 Results
4.1 The main model
This section reports the simulation results, where we start with the main
model of interest. We then discuss the two other models before we conduct
some sensitivity simulations.
Figure 1 about here
In Figure 1, the results for all 4083 possible coalitions are plotted, each rep-
resenting the outcome for a coalition when applying the model by Helm [14].
Of these coalitions, 4077 are not internally stable and depicted by empty grey
triangles. Note that not all of them appear unlled; however, this simply re-
ects that there are many stacked closely together. We see that they mainly
have an e¢ ciency index less than zero, that is, they are less e¢ cient than the
classical non-cooperative case without any emissions trading. Furthermore,
there is a tendency that the larger the coalition, the less e¢ cient the outcome.
There are six coalitions that are internally stable, all involving only two
parties. For all practical purposes, they have similar economic e¢ ciency in-
dices that are positive yet close to zero.6 Thus, in the gure, they appear as
6Stable treaties will always have a positive e¢ ciency index. Conversely, there must be
at least one country that is worse o¤. Such a country would therefore prefer not to be part
of a climate deal, making it internally unstable.
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a single point. Among these six coalitions, one is also externally stable, thus
stable. The details of these six coalitions, together with some others for later
comparison, are given in Table 3.
Table 3 about here
We see from Table 3 that none of the internally stable coalitions includes
major parties such as the USA, Europe, China or India. What is common for
ve of the coalitions is Russian membership together with one other player and
where Russia is the permit seller. This illustrates a point made by Helm [14,
Proposition 1], in that low damagecountries become permit exporters, and
high damagecountries permit importers. Moreover, Russias trading part-
ner is a relatively small country with lower business as usual emissions and
higher marginal damages as compared with Russia. The only stable coalition
is Russia and Australia, with practically no emissions reductions or e¢ ciency
gains. Also worth noting is that a global climate treaty is not stable and
rather ine¢ cient.
4.2 Cartel formation game
We shall now look at the cartel formation game, where we start by allowing
for side payments.
Figure 2 about here
In Figure 2, agreements that are not potentially internally stable are marked
with a grey triangle and potentially internally stable coalitions are marked
with a red open triangle that is lled with green if also externally stable.
Putting stability requirements aside, we see that in contrast to the previous
model, there is a general trend that the larger the coalition, the greater the
economic e¢ ciency. This is a result that holds more generally. Recall from
(13) that the marginal payo¤ for all members of a coalition equals the ag-
gregate marginal damage of its members. Therefore, if enlarging any given
coalition with one more member, then e¢ ciency will unambiguously improve
when damages are positive and linear.7
Among the 4083 possible coalitions, 1095 are potentially internally stable,
240 of which are also externally stable, and therefore potentially stable under
7This is in contrast to the Helm model, where it follows by adding up (6) for all i 2 C
and making use of (5) that the common marginal payo¤ for permit trading parties equals
the average of their marginal damages.
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all denitions of external stability. This means that it is possible to make the
coalition stable via side payments. While the general upward e¢ ciency trend
also holds for coalitions that are potentially internally stable, there is a trade-
o¤ at the frontier. The coalition that delivers the most economic e¢ ciency,
which is compatible with stability, consists of merely three players: the USA,
Europe and China. There are also larger stable coalitions with up to seven
countries, but they yield less e¢ ciency.8 The details for these three coalitions
are given in Table 4, together with the outcomes of those that were stable in
the previous subsection.
Table 4 about here
Table 4 shows that the USAEuropeChina coalition delivers an economic
e¢ ciency index equal to 45.2 per cent. The underlying gures are such that
the USA is worse o¤ than if leaving the coalition, but China and Europe ben-
et su¢ ciently to pay the USA for not leaving. Hence, transfers are needed
to stabilize the coalition, and they must go from China and Europe to the
USA. The intuition for this is very much the same as for some results in
the gamma core, to be discussed in the next subsection. Furthermore, there
exist stable coalitions with up to seven countries, with USACanadaMexico
KoreaAustraliaRussiaChina being the one that delivers the most e¢ ciency.
Again, China must pay its coalition partners to stabilize the coalition.
If side payments are excluded (and therefore not part of Figure 1 and
Table 4), then nine of the 4083 coalitions are internally stable, all with two
members. The best performing coalition among these is EuropeChina, which
produces an e¢ ciency index of 11.9 per cent. Other internally stable coali-
tions that deliver some emissions reductions are USAJapan, ChinaIndia,
the USABrazil and the USASouth Africa. The three remaining internally
stable coalitions o¤er e¢ ciency improvements below 1 per cent.
Only one of the internally stable coalitions, when side payments are banned,
is also externally stable: ChinaIndia, regardless of which notion of external
stability is applied. Two other coalitions, the USAJapan and JapanSouth
Africa, are stable both via majority and unanimity. To summarize, for the
case without side payments, there are few stable coalitions; they involve few
parties and deliver very modest e¢ ciency gains.
8Qualitatively speaking, Brechét et al. [2] report results with similar properties concern-
ing e¢ ciency and the number of participators.
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4.3 The gamma core
The last theory illustrated in this paper continues with the assumption that
members of a coalition are able to maximize their joint objectives, but where
the applied stability concept is in accordance with the gamma core. The un-
derlying details of an agreement that satises this stability property thereby
being both stable and e¢ cient are given in Table 5.
Table 5 about here
The rst column in Table 5 gives the payo¤ for each country in the core
when applying formula (14). The next column shows how the gains from co-
operation are distributed. The gures given in the column labelled transfers
describe the ow of money between the countries that are su¢ cient to secure
stability. The most important cash ows go from Europe, China and India
towards the USA, and although in smaller amounts, to Russia. These results
are counter to some everyday climate politics jargon, which says that indus-
trialized countries must pay for emissions reductions in developing countries
to get them on board.
To provide some intuition for these results, we start with the case of the
USA and then continue with a well-established general argument. Table 2
illustrates that the USA is worse o¤ with e¢ cient emissions reductions as
compared with the Nash equilibrium. The explanation is that a large share of
global emissions reductions when aiming for e¢ ciency is required to take place
in the USA. The abatement costs associated with these reductions are so large
that the resulting improved climate benets in the USA are not su¢ cient to
compensate for the associated abatement costs. This means that the USA
needs to be paid for reducing its emissions in order to nd it interesting not
to deviate. The payments to the USA typically come from countries that have
a signicant interest in a better climate (a high marginal damage) combined
with the lack of large and relatively inexpensive emissions abatement options.
Given the parameters of our model, such countries include China, India and
Europe.
While formula (14) clearly shows that all agents are better o¤ in the core
as compared with the classical non-cooperative outcome, it is not clear what
governs the side payments. However, the applied formula may, as in Chander
and Tulkens [7], be rearranged into the following:
Wi = [i (ei)  vi (e)] + [i (ei )  i (ei)] i
"X
j2I
j(e

j) 
X
j2I
j(ej)
#
. (16)
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The rst square bracket in (16) is the payo¤ a country obtains evaluated
at e¢ cient emissions, i.e. those that actually materialize. Therefore, the
remaining two brackets constitute the transfers, being positive if money is
received and negative if paid. As i (ei )  i (ei), the middle bracket signies
that agent i is compensated for the increased abatement cost associated with
cooperation. The last bracket indicates that agents must pay in proportion
with their marginal damage. Therefore, countries that are heavily a¤ected by
climate change combined with spending little additional resources on abating
emissions in moving from the non-cooperative Nash to Pareto optimal emis-
sions will have to pay countries that are not substantially a¤ected by climate
change but that are burdened with a large portion of the emissions reduc-
tion costs. As such, if poor countries are heavily a¤ected by climate change
with few possibilities for reducing their own emissions, they must pay the
rich countries for them to reduce emissions, in particular if the latter are not
substantially harmed by climate change. As Chander and Tulkens [7, p. 291]
explain, formula (16) ...[is] more in the spirit of the victim paysprinciple
than of the polluter paysprinciple. This only reects the fact that the eth-
ical values that inspire the latter are here in opposition to the self-interest
considerations that are called on to ensure voluntariness in cooperation and
deter free riding.
The nal two columns in Table 5 illustrate how the side payment scheme
may look if implemented via a permit market, where the price of permits
would equal the global marginal damage of climate change, here being US$97
per tonne carbon. The column Permit exportsgives the number of permits
a country in equilibrium would export, while the Initial quotacolumn gives
the initial distribution of quotas prior to trade, and relative to business as
usual emissions.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
The above results rest on many parameters that in reality are not well known.
Of importance are the level and the distribution of climate damage. Reported
here are some outcomes under alternative assumptions.
Thus far, the aggregate marginal damage has been set to $97 per tonne
of carbon. However, if we follow Carbone et al. [3] by replacing that number
with 650 but keeping our distribution of the damages, then our results are,
qualitatively speaking, not substantially a¤ected. That is, Figures 1 and 2
remain essentially intact. If we instead keep the $97 per tonne carbon gure,
the main qualitative picture remains unchanged if we alter the distribution
more in line with Carbone et al. [3] as follows: USA 20:9, Canada 2:1, Mexico
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0:0, Europe 41:9, Japan 20:1, Korea 2:1China 0:0, India 0:0, Brazil 0:0 and
South Africa 0:0. That is, in the Helm model, most coalitions produce an
outcome with an e¢ ciency index below the no-trade solution, and there is a
tendency that the larger the coalition the lower the e¢ ciency. Nevertheless,
there are stable coalitions with up to four players (in contrast to merely two),
yet they all have an economic e¢ ciency index below 5 per cent.
5 Summary and concluding remarks
This paper revisited three models dealing with international e¤orts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, with the main motivation and focus of the game
dened by Helm [14] where quotas are set individually and non-cooperatively.
With our parameters, that game yielded little environmental and economic
e¢ ciency. These results are less optimistic than those in Carbone et al. [3].
While our analysis did not explicitly account for general equilibrium e¤ects,
that of Carbone et al. [3] do, and they emphasize their importance. Our
results for the two other models are more in line with the comparable litera-
ture. Some models that we did not discuss above include farsighted coalition
stabilityas in Osmani and Tol [20], and the possibility of having multiple
coalitions, e.g. Sáiz et al. [21].
Even though the three models we considered produce radically di¤erent
outcomes, they all seem to have a common property: countries that are heav-
ily a¤ected by damages, but have few opportunities to abate emissions at low
costs, must pay countries that are not as substantially a¤ected but have cheap
abatement options. The economic intuition for this result is similar to estab-
lished arguments on comparative advantages in international trade. That this
may disagree with other, perhaps ethical, considerations may thus illustrate
why climate negotiations thus far have shown little success.
Our analysis has many well-known and obvious shortcomings. To name
but a few, we did not consider dynamics and uncertainty. Furthermore, en-
dogenous general equilibrium e¤ects were not accounted for. Further, while
we only dealt with 12 major greenhouse gas emitters, we believe that the neg-
ative avour of our results would only be further reinforced if more countries
were included in the analysis.
Despite these shortcomings, we emphasize that when international emis-
sions trading is made central in a climate deal, it creates certain incentives
that are absent when trade is ruled out. If governments do not act on these
incentives and rather are able to make the aggregate target su¢ ciently tight,
then the good properties of emissions trading will apply. However, if gov-
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ernments do take these incentives into consideration by means of demanding
generous quotas, that may undermine the e¤ectiveness of the treaty to such an
extent that little will be achieved. It seems to us that anecdotal evidence thus
far points towards the latter situation rather than the former, if anywhere at
all.
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Table 1. Parameterization of the economy. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Emissions and payoffs in no-trade non-cooperative Nash, and Pareto optimality. 
 
 
 
 
 
Marginal benefit 
intercept, a i
Marginal benefit 
slope, c i
Business as 
usual emissions
Marginal 
damage, v' i
Share of total 
damage, α i
Units US$/tC US$yr/M(tC)
2
MtC/yr US$/tC %
USA 754 0.37                 2013.6 15.1 16 %
Canada 657 3.39                 193.8 1.3 1 %
Mexico 720 5.41                 133.1 2.4 2 %
Europe 1026 0.92                 1112.8 19.5 20 %
Japan 1042 2.89                 361.1 5.7 6 %
Korea 720 5.30                 135.8 1.5 2 %
Australia 657 5.67                 115.9 0.9 1 %
Russia 1006 2.14                 470.3 0.3 0 %
China 1328 0.92                 1437.5 24.3 25 %
India 834 2.20                 378.9 18.4 19 %
Brazil 720 3.65                 197.4 3.6 4 %
South Africa 720 9.85                 73.1 4.2 4 %
Total 6623.4 97.0 100 %
Nash 
emissions 
reductions
Pareto 
emissions 
reductions
Pareto less 
Nash 
emissions 
reductions
Nash 
equilibrium 
payoff
Pareto 
efficient 
payoffs
Pareto 
improvement 
payoffs over 
Nash
Units % % MtC/yr BUS$/yr BUS$/yr BUS$/yr
USA 2.0 % 12.9 % 219 -99 -102 -3.0
Canada 0.2 % 14.8 % 28 -8 -9 -0.6
Mexico 0.3 % 13.5 % 17 -16 -15 0.6
Europe 1.9 % 9.5 % 84 -127 -120 7.0
Japan 0.5 % 9.3 % 32 -37 -35 1.8
Korea 0.2 % 13.5 % 18 -10 -10 0.0
Australia 0.1 % 14.8 % 17 -6 -6 -0.3
Russia 0.0 % 9.6 % 45 -2 -4 -2.0
China 1.8 % 7.3 % 79 -159 -149 10.1
India 2.2 % 11.6 % 36 -120 -111 9.1
Brazil 0.5 % 13.5 % 26 -23 -23 0.9
South Africa 0.6 % 13.5 % 9 -27 -25 2.1
Total 1.5 % 10.7 % 610 -634 -608 25.6
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Figure 1. Climate agreements with non-cooperative trade. All coalitions. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Climate agreements with non-cooperative trade. Selected coalitions. 
 
 
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Number of signatories
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 e
ff
. 
in
d
ex
Others Internally stable Stable (open membership) BAU
Permit price Environmental Efficiency Internal
 (USD/tC)  index index stability open unanimity majority
Noncooperative equilibrium 0.000 0.000 √
Can–SA 2.71 0.000 0.001 √ √ √
Rus–Mex 1.36 0.000 0.001 √ √ √
Rus–Kor 0.89 0.000 0.001 √ √ √
Rus–Aus 0.59 0.000 0.000 √ √ √ √
Rus–Bra 1.94 0.001 0.001 √ √ √
Rus–SA 2.22 0.001 0.003 √ √ √
US–Eur–Chi 19.63 0.012 0.023 √ √
US–Can–Jap–Aus–Rus–Chi 7.92 -0.048 -0.093 √ √
US–Can–Mex–Kor–Aus–Rus–Chi 6.54 -0.057 -0.112 √
Grand coalition 8.08 -0.068 -0.131 √ √ √
External stability
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Figure 2. Climate agreements as a cartel with side payments. All coalitions. 
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Table 4. Climate agreements as a cartel with side payments. Selected coalitions. 
 
 
Table 5. Payoffs and transfers in the gamma core. 
 
 
Permit price Environmental Efficiency Pot. int.
 (USD/tC)  index index stability open unanimity majority
Noncooperative equilibrium 0.000 0.000 √
Can–SA 5.42 0.002 0.005 √
Rus–Mex 2.71 0.002 0.004 √
Rus–Kor 1.78 0.001 0.003 √
Rus–Aus 1.17 0.001 0.002 √
Rus–Bra 3.88 0.003 0.007 √
Rus–SA 4.44 0.003 0.007 √
US–Eur–Chi 58.88 0.323 0.452 √ √ √ √
US–Can–Jap–Aus–Rus–Chi 47.54 0.279 0.447 √ √ √ √
US–Can–Mex–Kor–Aus–Rus–Chi 45.77 0.269 0.438 √ √ √ √
Grand coalition 97.00 1.000 1.000 √ √ √
External stability
Payoff Core Transfers Permit Initial
in the payoff in exports quota
gamma core less Nash core allowance
Units BUS$/yr BUS$/yr BUS$/yr MtC/yr %
USA -94.8 4.0 7.0 72.5 9.3 %
Canada -7.9 0.3 1.0 9.8 9.7 %
Mexico -15.1 0.6 0.0 0.3 13.2 %
Europe -121.9 5.1 -1.8 -18.9 11.1 %
Japan -35.5 1.5 -0.3 -3.5 10.3 %
Korea -9.3 0.4 0.4 3.8 10.7 %
Australia -5.5 0.2 0.5 5.4 10.1 %
Russia -1.8 0.1 2.1 21.6 5.0 %
China -152.6 6.4 -3.6 -37.5 9.9 %
India -115.0 4.8 -4.3 -44.2 23.3 %
Brazil -22.5 0.9 0.0 0.5 13.2 %
South Africa -26.0 1.1 -1.0 -9.9 27.0 %
Total -608.0 25.6 0.0 0.0 10.7 %
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